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Sherwin: Affirmative Action: A Case for Substantive Labour Law

PART II: RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
CASE FOR SUBSTANTIVE LABOUR LAW
SUSAN SHERWIN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly all labour law concerning unions in Canada and the United
States deals with questions of procedures and structures rather than
with substantive terms. Legislation governing trade union activity is
aimed at facilitating the activity of collective bargaining. Relatively
little legislation addresses the actual terms and conditions of employment; the latter is left to the outcome of collective bargaining. This
orientation is by design, for the legislature assumes that the specific
details, terms and conditions of employment, are best left to the
negotiating parties. Legislative bodies believe their role is limited to
ensuring that negotiations can take place and that it is improper to
try to shape such negotiations. At work is the fundamental assumption that government should not attempt to prescribe in any detail
the substantive terms that may be found in collective agreements.
By and large, I believe that this basic assumption is well founded
and I shall review some of the reasons that support a laissez-faire
position with regard to the terms of any negotiated settlement. Chiefly,
these reasons reflect a recognition of the fact that the terms and conditions of employment negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement
are of primary concern to the parties of the agreement. In most circumstances, therefore, the union and the employer are the best judges
of acceptable terms.
Nonetheless, there seem to be matters of substance which ought
to be included in collective agreements, but which are unlikely to be
negotiated by the bargaining parties because of the nature of the
bargaining process. For example, affirmative action hiring programs
and other forms of protection against systemic discrimination are
seldom achieved by collective bargaining, and yet there are reasons
to believe such programs are required as a matter of justice. Specific
* Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University.
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legislation appears to be the only method available for introducing
such policies when they are needed most. Extending the scope of
legislative intervention into the traditional bargaining domain,
however, threatens the integrity of other contractual matters which
are otherwise reserved for the collective bargaining process.
It is necessary, then, to carefully consider the reasons supporting the general presumption against substantive interference in the
bargaining process by the legislature about matters traditionally
reserved for collective bargaining. To this end, we must look closely
at the various situations in which this policy clashes with other matters of social concern. The goal of this analysis is to identify a principle by which we might determine when intervention in some of the
matters of workplace organization is appropriate and when it is
improper.
There is some vagueness inherent in the terminology I appeal
to, for there is no precise distinction to be drawn between procedural
and substantative labour law. Nonetheless, there is an important difference to be recognized. The term "procedural labour law" refers
to law concerned with allowing the process of collective bargaining
to occur. I shall use the term "substantive labour law" to mean any
law originating outside of the bargaining activity' which determines
matters of employment that are generally considered to be either
management rights or subject to negotiation by the parties. Thus
substantative labour law determines or shapes specific workplace
arrangements, and in that sense it restricts the parties from
negotiating conflicting arrangements in some other fashion. In this
paper, I intend to clarify the proper scope of such substantative labour
law.
II.

THE BIAS AGAINST SUBSTANTIVE LABOUR LAW

The emphasis on procedural labour law reflects a legislative commitment to collective bargaining. The legislation and regulation affecting collective bargaining is explicitly concerned with designing procedures for facilitating its practice. Labour relations acts express a
recognition of the value of collective bargaining; they seek to spell
out the relevant constraints that will bring bargaining about by
ensuring that both parties bargain in good faith. It would appear,
however, that existing labour law does not actually guarantee even
this much. There is certainly room for serious criticism about the
1. For instance, law imposed by government, and government appointed agencies such as the Labour Relations Board, as well as arbitrators.
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effectiveness of the actual legislation at accomplishing its purported
procedural goal, for it is still relatively easy for one party, usually
the employer, to frustrate the process and prevent meaningful negotiation. One of the most serious objections to existing labour law and
union activity is that collective bargaining is an option available only
to the least vulnerable workers. Those who need the protection of
unionization most are unable to force the employer to bargain, and
so there is reason to doubt the adequacy of the procedural law.
Nonetheless, we can still accurately describe existing labour law in
Canada and the U.S. as being chiefly, if imperfectly, concerned with
allowing collective bargaining to occur when employees choose to
unionize.
In contrast to procedural matters, we find very few specific directions in legislation that can be considered substantative. In Canadian
labour law, there is a requirement that a provision be made for hearing and resolving grievances and that there be explicit limits on the
right of either party to the use of economic sanctions while the agreement is in force. Generally, Canadian legislation also requires a clause
in the agreement that recognizes the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its members, and some jurisdictions demand a clause
prohibiting dismissal except for just cause.! Arguably, these
requirements can also be seen as procedural, for in content they simply
demand that certain mechanisms be available or followed. However,
in a broad sense of the term, they are substantive because they involve
legislative direction specifying clauses that must appear in collective
agreements and prohibiting the parties from agreeing to some conflicting arrangement.
Collective bargaining agreements are also bound by general
legislation, such as that incorporated by human rights law and general
criminal law. Of course, they must be consistent with provisions
governing employment generally; that is, those provisions contained
in the various labour standards acts must be complied with in all
employment contexts, though this need not be specified in the actual
collective agreements. For example, statutory holidays must be
honoured, unemployment insurance fees collected, Workmen's Compensation Provisions accounted for, and basic health and safety
requirements met. Hence, contract provisions must be compatible with
minimum wage laws, and reflect existing legislation on provisions for
maternity and sick leave and termination of employment.

2. H. ARTHURS, D. CARTER
RELATIONS IN CANADA 51 (1981).
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Beyond these general conditions applying to all employees, the
legislation on collective bargaining is almost wholly procedural. It
spells out the necessary criteria which must be satisfied for a union
to be acknowledged as the exclusive bargaining agent for a specified
group of workers. This legislation clarifies the obligation of each party
to meet and negotiate with the other once a union is certified. It protects workers against intimidation from either the employer or the
union, and it imposes a duty of fair representation on a union on behalf
of all members of the bargaining unit. While it defines a collective
bargaining agreement as a contract specifying the terms and conditions of employment in a specific workplace, it deliberately refrains
from'directing the parties as to what terms are permissible or required
beyond those cited above.
Interestingly, the most significant intrusion into the substance
of collective bargaining agreements which labour legislation makes
is the Canadian demand that all agreements contain provisions for
grievance and arbitration.' It is arbitration that provides the bulk of
jurisprudence in labour law, since it is in arbitration that collective
agreements are subject to formal interpretation and evaluation by an
external agent. This phenomenon raises the possibility that the law
might govern collective bargaining agreements more precisely through
the judicial process of arbitration.
In grievance arbitration as in labour legislation, however, there
is agreement that it is improper to try to specify the substantive content of the terms and conditions of employment.' Arbitrators are
responsible for interpreting but not changing the words of the collective agreement. Their job is to provide clarification within the terms
of the agreement when the parties disagree about the proper meaning of the words: when a situation arises that is not specificially
addressed: or when a contradiction is identified in the directions of
the agreement and the parties disagree about which principle is to
take priority. Arbitrators are specifically limited by the terms of the
collective agreement. They cannot neglect the provisions included for
the sake of some more sensible rule or even for a more fair outcome.
They are bound to respect the terms which the parties chose for
themselves when negotiating the agreement. Thus, the will of the
parties remains paramount.

3. This formal demand, common in Canadian law, is not found in American
Labour law, but in point of fact, almost all American collective bargaining agreements
include some such process.
4. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator,Wis. L. REv. 3-46 (1963)
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There is a form of arbitration which allows arbitrators the
authority to set the terms of the agreement, namely, interest arbitration. It is sometimes legislated for unions designated as working in
the area of "essential services," especially for public service workers,
and it is usually contentious as a required mechanism. Sometimes it
is chosen by the parties as a procedure for resolving an impasse in
negotiations without appealing to economic sanctions. In such cases,
it is invoked on specific questions, with the limits of the arbitrator's
decision-making authority carefully defined. Thus, even when
arbitrators are involved in setting contract terms, they are not granted
the authority to impose on the parties some aspect of the terms and
conditions of employment which neither party is interested in providing for. Their role is limited to selecting among competing proposals presented by the parties.
Clearly, it is not accidental that labour legislation and the
jurisprudence of arbitration decisions and labour relations board hearings are overwhelmingly occupied with procedural questions and
refrain from making specific directives on the actual terms and conditions of employment. It is a clear reflection of the underlying principle of labour law which demands a large scope for the autonomy
of parties in setting the terms and conditions of employment. There
is a wide recognition that it is desirable to ensure that the parties
agree on the terms of the collective agreement themselves.
There are several good reasons for this basic principle against
legislative involvement with precise workplace arrangements. The
most significant one is that there is a great deal of variety in the
needs associated with different workplaces. The specific contract provisions must be appropriate to the needs of the parties to that particular agreement. Any attempt to anticipate explicit terms is sure
to be inappropriate in some contexts. The expectations and priorities
of workers and managers in every employment situation are likely
to be unique. Attempts to draft legislation to bind workers and
employers in different contexts are certain to create difficulties in
some areas. Even within a particular workplace, it is difficult for
someone new to the situation to identify the real needs of both parties no matter how objective and well intentioned she may be. The
arrangements that exist between a particular union and the employer
can be very complex and reflect a delicate balance; it is unlikely that
some outside party can fully appreciate the subtleties. Thus, it is
thought dangerous even to allow arbitrators to decide substantive
questions for a specific workplace. A strict policy of non-interference
on the details of structuring the working life of bargaining unit
members has evolved for those outside agents who are responsible
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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for formulating and developing the jurisprudence of labour law.
Moreover, there is a significant psychological value to be gained
by having the parties know that they must agree on the terms and
conditions of employment. A collective agreement is the basis of labour
relations where it operates. If union and employer know they must
agree on its terms, they will nearly always, however reluctantly, forge
an agreement that each can live with. The priorities of each party
will be accommodated. Having explicitly declared their ability to accept
the terms of the agreement, they are psychologically more inclined
to try to make the agreement work. If some terms are imposed from
outside, however, there is a possibility that either one or both of the
parties may never truly commit itself to their fulfillment.
A collective agreement must be a contract which both parties
are committed to enforcing. If it contains provisions unacceptable to
either or both parties which have been imposed by some third party,
like the legislature, the labour relations board, or some arbitrator,
there may be lacking the important sense of that provision being one
that serves the needs of either party to the agreement. No gains will
be negotiated as a condition of its acceptance and neither side may
have much interest in ensuring that it is honoured; also there will
be no mechanism for relief if it creates havoc in its application. Further, any matter removed from the bargaining process reduces the
room the parties have for manoeuvring; negotiation involves compromises and trade-offs, and hence it demands a fairly large agenda
to permit room for each side to compromise and yet hold on to items
it values dearly.
Further, external direction in the substance of collective
agreements simply flies in the face of tradition. Labour law is founded
on a tradition which recognizes the effectiveness and value of
indigenous law developed within distinct work institutions. Any
systematic attempt to direct the actual terms of settlement in collective bargaining contexts from some external legal basis would undermine one of the most fundamental principles guiding labour relations
in North America. The result may be a significant transformation in
the workings of collective bargaining. There are many grounds for
being dissatisfied with labour law as it has evolved in North America,
but there is little consensus on how it should be changed. Collective
bargaining remains a fragile structure at best, and one must be quite
cautious in attempting to change the understood principles of its operation. Legislating within the normal subject matter of collective bargaining agreements constitutes a major transformation in collective
bargaining practice and hence must be approached with extreme
caution.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/5
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Thus, we face a powerful inertial force in contemplating explicit
legal intervention in bargaining practice. Nonetheless, despite the past
practice to the contrary and the arguments just reviewed against
substantive labour law, there are situations that seem to call for such
action. I shall now explore a case in point.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Since collective bargaining is a process for negotiating terms and
conditions of employment between two interested parties-the
employer on one hand and the bargaining agent or union representing the employees on the other-the matters which will be negotiated
are those which at least one of the parties feels strongly about.
Negotiation is usually a long and difficult process. It is unreasonable
to expect complex matters to be considered unless at least one of
the parties believes it to be important.
Affirmative action policies offer a paradigm case of the sort of
issue which is not likely to be addressed if left to the initiative of
either the union or the employer. Affirmative action policies are
valuable because of their effect in improving social justice. They are
designed to increase the number of candidates hired from among
groups subject to systemic discrimination in society on the basis of
sex, race, ethnic or language group, physical handicap, or some such
characteristic. For simplicity sake, I shall concentrate on a single
category: affirmative action hiring plans which are designed to increase
the numbers of women in job categories where they remain underrepresented at this time. Similar arguments are appropriate in dealing with other disadvantaged groups such as racial minorities, and
other employment issues, like promotion and equal pay provisions.
In order to intelligently discuss "affirmative action hiring programs" one must first set forth exactly what they entail. Affirmative
action programs come in two main varieties, weak and strong. Weak
programs demand that a woman be hired if there is no substantially
better qualified male candidate. Strong programs direct hiring a woman
if there is a qualified female candidate available even if a male with
superior qualifications has applied. Quota plans, specifying a minimum
number or percentage of women that must be hired, are a special
case of strong programs. Strong programs are far more contentious
than weak ones and are relatively rare in practice.5 In job categories
that consist of a wide range of degrees of qualification, as in academic
5. Interestingly, strong programs have been invoked to benefit men, e.g.,
a quota system was used to increase the number of male telephone operators in the U.S.
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appointments or managerial hirings, strong programs involve a clash
of principles because they explicitly sacrifice meritocratic principles
in favour of social equality (since competency and gender outweigh
superior qualifications). In job categories that have quite precise
statements of qualification (e.g., Grade 10 education) there is little to
distinguish the weak from the strong programs. Where they are
distinct, obviously strong programs are especially controversial, for
debate reflects disagreement about the ordering of principles. I shall
not address that controversy here because the difficulty for labour
law arises with both forms of affirmative action programs. The
arguments presented here support both types of programs. I shall
not attempt to decide which strategy is preferable. In this paper, I
am only concerned with establishing the appropriateness of legislating
affirmative action programs of any type. I shall not comment then
on the details of what sort of programs or what kind of administrative
mechanism is to be employed.
The purpose of affirmative action programs is to help counteract
the effects of systemic discrimination. Systemic discrimination, in this
case sex, involves deepseated and widely practiced social patterns of
unjust discrimination based on a characteristic that should be irrelevant in the circumstances'. The systemic aspect of the discrimination
is very significant. It indicates a wide ranging pattern of injustice
against members of a group, not merely a collection of isolated events.
As such, it is particularly difficult to eradicate, and it is often dif-'
ficult even to recognize because when it is systemic, discrimination
is perceived as normal. It is widely acknowledged that sexism in our
culture is a very broadly based pattern of discrimination against
women. It is often unconscious and non-deliberate, but it results in
many inequities including disparate representation of women in many
job categories. Specifically, women are frequently concentrated in a
few particular job "ghettos" which tend to be low-paying and lacking
in influence.
The unequal treatment women receive in the employment context is especially problematic in light of the severe inequalities based
on gender in society in virtually all other arenas. Women are disadvantaged socially, politically, economically, and sexually. Often, women

6. Systemic discrimination is defined in the 1978 report of the Canadian
Human Rights Commission as a form of discrimination which "results when despite
the equal application of an employment practice there is disparate impact on certain
groups of workers and this impact cannot be related to job performance or the safe
and efficient operation of business."Id.
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are treated with contempt and disrespect in the popular culture and
information media. A women's freedom of movement is severely
limited by the threats of physical attack which women face in most
public places and, sometimes, even at home. Women are frequently
given a disproportionate share of childcare and home care
responsibilities but they are not provided with adequate support services. Access to abortion and daycare is severely limited, and yet
women are expected to compete for jobs on exactly the same terms
as men.
When women do find jobs they suffer serious discrimination in
the workplace. Unemployment and underemployment rates are nearly
always much higher for women than for men. According to the most
recent Canadian statistics, the average earned income of full-time
women workers was 58.1 percent of that of their male counterparts.
American statistics are similar; even when adjustments are made for
education and experience, women receive significantly lower wages
than men for the same type of jobs Socialization processes channel
women into low income, low security job categories.
Many economists now accept the analysis of a dual labour market
to account for these sex-linked disparities.9 The primary labour market
is the market of large corporations with heavy capital investment that
cannot afford significant labour turnover. Jobs in this market tend
to be unionized, well-paying, secure, and offer reasonable working conditions. The jobs in this primary market are dominated by white males.
The secondary labour market consists of small companies and service
or seasonal firms that are labour intensive and maintain flexibility
in expenses by hiring and laying off staff as the demand arises. In
this market, workers are seldom unionized, employment is insecure,
opportunities for advancement are rare, and wages are poor. Workers
here are drawn from racial and ethnic minorities, young people, and
women. In other words, systemic discrimination has been institutionalized in the labour market and is deeply embedded in it. It will
not readily disappear.
Not surprisingly, women tend to be employed in low-status, lowsecurity jobs as a result of this institutionalized systematic discrimination. In fact, the jobs which women frequently occupy are those concerned with the very responsibilities they are assigned in the home.

7.

P. PHILLIPS & E. PHILLIPS, WOMEN AND WORK: INEQUALITY IN THE LABOUR

MARKET 52 (Canadian Issues Series 1983).

8. Id. at 59-60.
9.

Id at 77-105.
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Most are concentrated in service jobs. Those employed in manufacturing are concentrated in the textiles and garments and food
processing industries. Designating certain job categories as women's
work has effectively kept wages low and security rare in those areas.
Women are largely excluded from the types of jobs that involve
high salaries, power and prestige. Today such exclusion is often not
explicit; in fact, we already have human rights legislation prohibiting
it. However, it was certainly explicit in the past. Historically, both
employers and unions have specifically excluded women from particular
job classifications 0 Now, the exclusion of women from high paying
jobs reflects more subtle constraints which have been dubbed "secondary sexism." Professor Warren defines secondary sexism as "comprising all those actions, attitudes and policies which, while not using
sex itself as a reason for discrimination, do involve sex-correlated factors or criteria and do result in an unfair impact upon 'certain'
women.""
Among secondary sexist practices that have contributed to less
than a proportional number of women employed in certain job
categories are arrangements that prohibit maternity leave, demand
gratuitous travel, make unnecessary transfer demands, insist on height
requirements, reflect a view that women's salaries are supplemental
and not essential to family income, and deny facilities for women in
jobs that require living on site. These are deemed secondary because
it is not being female per se that creates the problem, just the usual
roles and physical needs that tend to go along with it. Other practices are those that insist on uninterrupted work records, make
assumptions about child care responsibilities, and refrain from placing
women in positions of authority on the assumption that they will
encounter disrespect from other workers. These are all in addition
to the burden of years of socialization to sex role behavior which all
women have experienced, and which serves to discourage them from
being assertive, competitive, self-confident, or self-interested and which
thereby places them at an initial psychological disadvantage in a competitive job market.
The result, as might have been expected, is that although it has
now become the norm for women to work, they are largely excluded
10. The Trades & Labour Congress of Canada in 1898 called for "abolition
...of female labour in all branches of industrial life, such as mines, work-shops, factories, etc." Cited in White, Women & Unions, THE CANADIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
THE STATUS OF WOMEN 15, 11-18 (1980).

11.

Warren, Secondary Sexism and Quota Hiring,PHILOSOPHY

(1979).
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from important and well paying job categories. Such disproportionality
in representation in job categories based on sex no longer seems
natural or acceptable and is now recognized as evidence of a failure
to achieve genuine equality of opportunity. One of the most effective
ways of changing discrimination based on gender is to expose people
to counterexamples of their stereotypical views. Providing women with
access to influential jobs would help undermine stereotypical attitudes
by expanding people's experience with women's talents and abilities.
It would contribute to reforming the various social institutions that
perpetuate systemic discrimination.
Moreover, it is important that we recognize that the training
in passivity and submission which females receive in our culture constitutes a severe handicap in the competitive employment market.
Equality of opportunity cannot be achieved unless the effects of such
psychological oppression are compensated for. Further, since there
is evidence that both women and their evaluators tend to
underestimate the quality of women's work in comparison with how
the work of men is judged, there is reason to believe that women
who are judged to be equally or nearly as well qualified as some men
may in fact be better qualified. Thus, they may already be entitled
to the job under traditional considerations of merit once adjustment
is made to compensate for the common sexist bias.
Affirmative action programs are intended to increase genuine
equality of opportunity in light of some well-known barriers to women
and to reduce sexist attitudes in society. Social justice demands
measures to reduce the impact of systemic discrimination against
women. In these terms, it is argued that affirmative action programs
are necessary as a temporary measure to improve social justice. As
for the familiar objection that by making sex a criterion of choice
affirmative action is merely a case of reverse discrimination, we must
recognize that the disadvantage experienced by male candidates under
such a program are quite limited and minimal and not comparable
to the general oppression experienced by victims of systemic
discrimination. Reverse discrimination is simply not the same sort of
social problem as is systemic discrimination. In this case, male candidates lose some of the implicit advantage they are used to experiencing by virtue of their gender. When a job is awarded to a women
under an affirmative action plan, male applicants are not appointed.
The discrimination, such as it is, is limited to the particular incident
and not to complete role reversals in society. Widespread use of affirmative action programs will not result in men being frequently
raped by women and constantly under the threat of attack, or in men
being denied abortions, or in their receiving 60 percent of the salary
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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common to women, or in having virtually all of their elected representatives female. Affirmative action programs simply do not create patterns of injustice in society as does systemic discrimination and so
they cannot be dismissed on the same basis. Further, since it is implausible to believe that any candidate has a right to a job, there
is nothing unjust about including criteria that will contribute to overall
social justice among those used for selecting applicants.
Sexism, like racism, is a problem of systemic and structural
discrimination. Justice must be considered at the level of social
arrangements, not merely individual competition. Affirmative action
programs are justifiable as instruments for reducing systemic discrimination and increasing social equality. Once equality is achieved, such
unjustifiable. In the area of gender discrimination, however, we have
some time to go before we begin to dismantle such systems. Thus,
it is not necessary at this time to consider the details of ending these
programs.
The most serious problem for justifying affirmative action programs is to establish their effectiveness. Since they are purely
instrumental, their legitimacy is dependent on their success; it is essential that they be designed with care to achieve the ends intended.
This has not always happened, and some of the problems associated
with legislation adopted in the United States on this issue are commonly cited as grounds for abandoning the project." Without affirmative action programs, however, the force of systemic discrimination
against women in the workplace remains. We must be concerned that
discrimination is getting worse as large scale unemployment seems
to be becoming a permanent feature of the economy. In a tight job
market, women tend to be among the first laid off. Affirmative action
plans must also attend to the problem of ensuring that women keep
the jobs they win even if they do not have the highest seniotity.
The problems are serious. First, there remains a substantial
salary disparity. Second, the percentage of women in senior positions
remains relatively small. In fact the slight improvement seen in the
1970's has already been reversed: for example "an executive search
firm reported in 1982 that companies were no longer searching for
women for executive positions."' 3 The inference is that affirmative
action programs are necessary. The voluntary approach is not
adequate. However, programs must be designed with sensitivity and
12. See generally, W. BLOCK & M. WALKER, DISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE Ac.
TION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (1982).
13.

P. PHILLIPS & E. PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 164.
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care. Existing programs should be studied carefully to understand the
reasons for success and failure and particular plans must be made
adaptable to the specific demands of a given workplace. Successful
programs will help reduce sexism and systemic discrimination and are
justified on that basis.
I believe the arguments outlined in support of affirmative action
programs are valid. Although I have only sketched the outline here,
I believe it can be conclusively demonstrated that justice demands
affirmative action programs at this time. My analysis has been concerned with the claim that such programs may be justified by considerations of justice. For the purpose of this paper, however, it does
not matter if the particular example ultimately applies. The case for
affirmative action policies based on considerations of justice is strong
enough that it can be used, at least hypothetically, to illustrate the
problem of relying on the collective bargaining processes to settle all
matters concerning employment when a workplace is unionized.

IV. THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTION
Affirmative action provides an example of an issue which is
important according to significant value principles. This is especially
true with those issues concerned with social justice, where the rules of
collective bargaining mitigate against such matters being negotiated
into collective agreements.
The activity of collective bargaining is such that matters will
be negotiated only if they are either important to at least one of the
parties, or are of trivial consequence to one party. Any matter that
is strongly resisted by one party must be of serious concern to the
other if the latter is to be willing to negotiate it in good faith.
For most unions, affirmative action is not of much interest. It
is only appropriate in work situations which have a serious underrepresentation of women. Unfortunately, such groups are not likely
to feel the need to institute affirmative action policies. After all,
acknowledging the legitimacy of such policies involves calling into question the system by which all current members received their own jobs.
Affirmative action hiring policies are not infrequently linked with affirmative action promotion policies, and the latter threaten union
members' own likelihood of advancement. Thus, affirmative action
plans are not in the majority's interest and are sometimes actually
contrary to their interest. Also, negotiations involve trade-offs; a union
seldom gets everything it would like out of bargaining. Thus, for a
union to bargain strongly for such plans, it would probably have to
compromise on some other matter which would be in the members'
interest.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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Further, it is vital that affirmative action hiring policies involve
some degree of job security. Without some correlative job protection,
the familiar "last hired, first fired" policy is likely to make any gains
shortlived. This additional constraint, however, violates the traditional
union value of respect for seniority in lay-offs. Few unions are willing
to accept modification of seniority rules for any reason, and yet they
are an important corollary to affirmative action hiring.
Collective bargaining is not a procedure that fosters just behavior
from union members. It is designed to concentrate energies on matters which a majority of union members believe to be in their best
interest. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect many unions to make
affirmative action plans a high priority for bargaining.
The employer is also likely to be less than enthusiastic about
such plans. They involve an explicit infringement on the freedom to
hire, a practice jealously guarded as being within management rights.
Most employers are very anxious to maintain control over the selection of employees and are reluctant to restrict that freedom by any
mechanism involving regulation. Further, affirmative action plans are
justified as temporary measures to create better representation of
women in specific job categories where they are underrepresented.
The employer would have to admit that there has been an injustice
in the past that should be corrected in order to support such a plan.
Employers, like most people, are unwilling to admit to any objectionable behaviour in their past. In the rare cases where the employer
does take the lead, the union is likely to be highly suspicious that
the purpose is to circumvent union rights." Since adding women to
the job pool often results in lowering wages for relevant job categories,
unions are quite concerned when employers institute affirmative action
programs.
Thus, affirmative action plans are not likely to result from
collective bargaining, although that would be the ideal way of introducing them into unionized places of employment. In fact, the evidence
supports the a priori conclusion that collective bargaining is not a
reliable procedure for introduction of affirmative action plans. A report
by the Ontario Federation of Labour in May, 1982, determined that
14. Local 1353, Canadian Union of Public Employees, Borough of North New
York, Board of Education, Union Position in Response to the Affirmative Action Proposals of the Boards 2 (1982), cited in Chegwidden & Katz, American and Canadian
Perspectives on affirmative Action: A Response to the Fraser Institute, 2 J. OF Bus.
ETHICS 197 (1983). The response was written when the Board of Education seemed to
use an affirmative action plan as an excuse to circumvent the collective bargaining
process.
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"over a seven year period 175 programs have been put in place
(1975-82), an average of twenty per year. . . .At the current rate
of twenty programs per year, it will take 13,300 years to begin
affirmative action programs in all Ontario companies."15 Left to the
forces of collective bargaining, affirmative action programs are too
rare and infrequent to accomplish their general goals.'
Although we have available a program that can be expected to
reduce sexism and to increase justice, it is not likely to be adopted
by the ordinary channels of collective bargaining. It is a program that
is valuable for reasons of justice, but it is largely inaccessible by
collective bargaining procedures, since it is not in the obvious selfinterest of either party. In fact, it is probably contrary to the interest
of both a majority of employers and the majority of union members.
Any effort to impose affirmative action policies will require
legislative intrusion into areas of employment practice usually reserved
for negotiation. Yet, protecting those areas as the perogative of the
parties to collective bargaining makes affirmative action unlikely. In
these matters, the autonomy of the parties in the bargaining process
may run counter to the important social goal of increased equality.
Thus, a case can be made for overriding the autonomy of the parties
and legislating affirmative action programs where they are
appropriate.
I shall not comment on the details of that legislation. Many
options are available including the use of quotas or ratios without
reference to any of the details of how they should be achieved. Alternatively, it may be determined that the legislation should be largely
procedural, by carefully constructing a hiring mechanism. The obvious
constraint of any legislation is the requirement that the mechanism
used should be sufficiently flexible to be properly adapted to each
particular workplace and, of course, that it should be effective.
Whatever mechanism is chosen, whether it is itself procedural (specifying how hiring is to take place) or substantative (specifying what
results must be achieved), the act of legislating this matter involves
interference on substantative matters. These matters include primarily
hiring, and additional pay scales, promotion and lay-off criteria, all
15. Our Fair Share: Affirmative Action and Women 18 (a discussion paper
prepared for the Ontario Federation of Labour Conference on Affirmative Action and
Women, Toronto, May 1982). cited in Chegwidden & Katz, supra note 14, at 199.
16. The failure of the voluntary approach is confirmed by a study of employment practices in Halifax from 1979-81 by K. Edward Renner and Leslie Gillis, reported
in Employment Practicesand Opportunitiesfor Women: Why Voluntary Affirmative Action is Inadequate, forthcoming in STATUS OF WOMEN NEWS.
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of which are traditionally protected as the prerogative of the parties
to collective bargaining.
Further sexism, however, is not the only social problem that affirmative action programs can ameliorate. Discrimination on the basis
or race, language, religion, sexual preference and orientation, and
physical handicaps is also of serious concern. Perhaps, far more complex
affirmative action programs should be initiated. Further, other social
issues arise. For example, unemployment might be reduced if
worksharing were instituted. 7 In light of such expectation, perhaps
it, too, should be required. Also, retraining programs and socially conscious introduction of technology would be valuable; yet employers
find such demands expensive and unions sometimes worry that the
costs of such measures will come out of workers' pockets.
Part-time workers present another complex set of concerns.
Aruguably, better benefits for part-time work would help to reduce
unemployment. Employers prefer to keep part-time staff as a "flexible"
work force. In contrast, unions often cannot be troubled by them, or
may even see part-timers as a threat to the gains of full-time workers.
Thus, usually no one bargains for the interest of part-time workers,
and frequently they are treated badly.
There are many matters of concern that collective bargaining
leaves inadequately addressed; it is tempting to view them all as
legislative concerns since it would be desirable to have these matters
attended to. There is a clear danger, however, of broadening the scope
of labour law ever further; by such action we would be continually
weakening the fundamental principle of respecting the autonomy of
the bargaining process. The goal of preserving a wide scope for
bargaining might easily be lost in a detailed and complex set of regulations which leaves little for the parties to bargain about. It is important, therefore, to refine the principle necessitating legislative
interference more precisely. In particular, a simple utilitarian style
ideology that allows legislative interferenice whenever some good consequence could be achieved is far too generous. Let us consider some
situations where bad consequences of a autonomous bargaining process
have been identified and see why they do not provide justification
for legislative interference. In light of such examples, we will be able
to refine the principle justifying intervention so that it is not too
readily invoked at the expense of abandoning the fundamentals of collective bargaining.
17.

For an explanation and discussion of worksharing, see generaily N. METZ.

F. REID & G. SWARTZ, SHARING THE WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES IN WORKSHARING
AND JOBSHARING (1981).
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V.

REFINING THE PRINCIPLE FOR INTERVENTION

The arguments in favour of some form of intervention fall into
two general categories. One set has to duwith the interests of the
parties, especially bargaining unit members. The other set pertains
to broad social concerns, often identified as the public good or interest.
The concern for intervention, based on the interests of bargaining unit members, rests on the assumption that sometimes a union
does not provide adequate protection for its members' interests. For
instance, much of the literature citing the inadequacy of collective
bargaining practice focuses on the failure of unions to benefit their
members in many cases. This problem arises for many reasons. It
occurs when a union is particularly weak. The expectation on which
collective bargaining practice is built is the notion that although the
employer tends to be in a stronger bargaining position than each
independent employee prior to unionization, when employees act collectively through a union, they gain power more closely comparable
to that of the employer's. Under the expected circumstances of two
parties of approximately equal strength negotiating for their respective interests, collective bargaining is relied on to result in reasonably
fair outcomes.
It is sometimes clear, however, that this assumption is unduly
optimistic. Even when employees act collectively they may still be
significantly weaker than the employer. Procedural rules governing
collective bargaining can go some way towards reducing the force of
such inequality, but they can hardly eliminate its significance. When
one party is significantly stronger than the other, unjust terms may
be demanded. Given the potential for abuse of excessive power in
collective bargaining contexts, there is a prima facie case to be made
for some impartial party to spell out equitable contractual terms, or
at least to set outside limits on the terms which might be acceptable,
so that when one side is actually strong enough to coerce a disadvantageous agreement from the other, the vulnerable party can be protected against exploitation.
In fact, legislative protection against some degree of exploitation has already been built into general labour law statutes which
apply to all workers, whether unionized or not. Minimum wage laws,
human rights legislation, provisions governing termination of employment, guarantees of maternity leave and sick leave, and so on, are
all matters now governed by statute or commonlaw and apply to virtually all employees. They cannot be bargained away in any negotiations. Thus, very weak unions cannot be coerced into sacrificing such
fundamental interests of their members. More significantly, those
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workers who lack even the strength to unionize are ensured some
protection of their interests. Workers are largely protected from
sacrificing these fundamental matters of security and dignity out of
sheer desperation for work. Fortunately, only the most desperate and
vulnerable workers are beyond the scope of this sort of general
legislative protection. Unionization demands a certain amount of
strength to begin with; therefore, workers who are unionized tend
to be strong enough to avoid the worst types of exploitation.
For reasons mentioned earlier, it is complex and risky to try
to provide any further protection to unionized workers. Different work
situations present different areas of concern. Just as there is no
general principle identifying the common needs of all vulnerable
unions, there is also no general principle available which could sort
the weak and vulnerable unions from the strong and powerful ones
for the purpose of further aid. Thus, there is no obvious way of
guaranteeing other contractual terms beyond ensuring the effective
working of the collective bargaining structure. Some unions will fare
worse than others but all are now protected against excessive
exploitation.
Also, there are cases where unions are more powerful than their
employer. In such circumstances it would hardly facilitate justice to
provide unions with automatic guarantees on certain aspects of the
contract which would serve to allow them to concentrate their efforts
on making even stronger demands regarding other aspects of the contract. Although judicial interference may seem to be desirable in some
cases, the difficulties of managing it in the universal fashion which
judicial solutions demand make such forays look far too risky to
recommend.
For comparable reasons, it is proper to resist substantive interference to protect employers who are dealing with overly powerful
unions. While some unions are in enormously powerful bargaining positions, although most are not, it would be vastly unfair to the rest
to handicap them further by setting limits on their possible gains in
specific areas. It is important to remember that collective bargaining
exists in a historical context. The terms of their experience before
bargaining is completed. External corrections that direct specific terms
on specific items are bound to create distortion in those other matters that remain to be bargained over.
Procedural controls rather than external substantive direction
seems the least dangerous and most acceptable means of protecting
the parties in the face of a stronger adversary. Therefore, despite
the temptation in some cases, the interests of workers faced with a
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/5
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powerful employer, and vice versa, do not seem to constitute adequate
grounds for altering the normal expectations- of trade union labour
law which explicitly refrains from making substantive proposals on
terms and conditions of collective bargaining agreements. These situations are best addressed in the traditional way, by controlling the
procedures by which the parties negotiate those terms.
There is another possible basis for legal intervention in the actual
terms of a collective bargaining agreement in the interest of justice
for bargaining unit members. Collective bargaining assumes that
unions always act in the interests of their members. This is
presumably the most fundamental premise of all, and yet there are
surely occasions when unions, union leaders and negotiators do not
foster their members' interests. Under such circumstances, the wellbeing of bargaining unit members can only be ensured by some sort
of external legal injunction.
The most obvious cases for concern are the most widely
publicized cases of corrupt and irresponsible union leadership. Unions,
especially large ones, are centers of significant power and wealth. As
such, control of a union can be very attractive to persons who lack
concern for moral and legal principles. Corrupt leaders do not always
fulfill their obligations of protecting the employment interests of their
members. But there is no justification here for sidestepping union
responsibilities and legislating contract terms as a solution to the
occasional problem of corruption in unions. Surely the way to deal
with this problem is by restricting the behaviour of leaders through
sanctions against the abuse of power.
A far more subtle and potentially much broader problem of
adequate representation of employee interests is the danger of
co-optation of union leaders. Union leaders have a strong institutional
motivation to pursue some degree of co-operation with the employer
and it is always difficult to judge when co-operation may be excessive
and turn out to be costly to members' interests.
Radical critics of collective bargaining see this danger as one
of the most serious institutional problems of unions. They believe that
the need of unions to develop cooperative arrangements with
employers is the structural cause of an inherent conservatism of
unions. Since the job of a union is to produce a collective agreement
with management, union negotiators must seek a common ground with
the employer. They must accept and not challenge the existing
economic structures of society and the existing authority of management. By regularly raising wages and benefits they ensure continuing worker support for the overall status quo of workplace structures.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso
University Law
Review, Vol. 19, No.
1 [1984],
Art. 5
VALPARAISO
UNTVERSITY
LAW
REVIEW

114

[Vol. 19

Naturally, union negotiators concentrate their efforts in areas where
they are most likely to reach agreement with management, and thus
the effect of collective bargaining is said to be an entrenchment of
management's authority and workers' subservience. 8
Union leaders acquire a stake in having relations with management run smoothly. If they cannot reach agreement with the employer,
there is no point in the workers' supporting a union. This makes
co-optation a realistic option for union negotiators and leaders. But
even if co-optation of leadership is a genuine problem for unions as
it is perceived to be by radical union members and analysts, it would
not be a satisfying solution to look to legislative control. First,
legislative responses would surely be far too conservative in substance
to satisfy the radical concern with co-optation. Further, the problem
of co-optation is inherent in the very structure of collective bargaining. It cannot be accounted for by adjusting some of the provisions
of the collective agreements negotiated. Rather, if it is to be resolved, it must be in terms of reconsidering the very foundations of collective bargaining. Major systemic overhaul is the least that would
be required, but it is by no means clear that there is any way to
eliminate the possibility and danger of co-optation so long as we continue to have the representatives of two parties meeting together
repeatedly to negotiate their separate interests.
There is, however, one type of case of worker protection that
does seem to merit serious consideration; the case of special interests
within unions. This is the generalized case of the affirmative action
argument. Unions are expected to be democratic institutions, and as
such they suffer from the problems inherent in any democracy,
especially the problem commonly identified as "the tyranny of the
majority." Within a democratic structure, policy decisions reflect the
interests of the majority even when these are unjust. In unions with
a minority of women members, for instance, equal pay provisions,
maternity leave, day care facilities, and sexual harassment protection
are frequently neglected in contract talks. Often when such matters
are included on the union's agenda, they appear as minor trade offs
against more popular issues. The interests of the minority are
sacrificed in pursuit of more broadly based concerns.

18.

Some radical authors object to unions on precisely these grounds, for "col-

lective bargaining tends to accommodate employees to a status of subordination...
. Trade unionism permits debate around the terms of workers' obedience, while not
challenging the facts of their subordination." R. HYMAN & I. BROUGH, SOCIAL VALUES
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A STUDY OF FARINESS AND EQUALITY 71 (1975).
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A number of political solutions have evolved for handling the
problem of minority interests in democracy. Sometimes minorities
improve their opposition by shrewedly forming coalitions with other
minority interest groups so as to muster a majority when votes are
taken on particularly important issues. Other times they get support
from members of the majority group who anticipate being in a
minority on some later issue and hence are eager to ensure that votes
not be taken on purely self-interested grounds. Thus, the power of
the majority is often not invoked against the minority, since everyone
faces the possibility of being in the minority on some issue and seeks
to pursue a suitable strategy for defense in that situation.
We may now return to the problem of systemic discrimination
as a pervasive social norm. Depending on their origin, some minority
alignments shift frequently and workers recognize themselves as
belonging to different groups for different purposes. Interests vary
in accordance with age, health, lifestyle, seniority, responsibility,
politics, religion and personality, and members who usually vote
together may occasionally find themselves differing. In these cases,
a laissez-faire governmental attitude seems proper. It is left to the
various groups to work out their alliances and priorities and no serious
harm is likely to result from the occasional missed vote. Belonging
to a minority interest group by virtue of being a victim of systemic
discrimination is, however, on a different plane. As noted above, the
problems of women in the workplace, like the problems of women in
society in general, are quite serious. Women have always been a
minority in terms of power, and no one really anticipates that changing in the near future. Men in the workplace do not identify with
women's concerns in the sense of worrying about suffering a similar
minority status.
There is no random shifting of political strength when minorities
are defined by systemic discrimination and not by some single issue.
It is because of the deep entrenchment of the problem that concern
for this sort of minority requires special consideration. Corrective
legislation is not appropriate everytime a special interest group is
outvoted. I suggest it is proper only when a particular group is
regularly and predictably outvoted and receives unequal benefits and
opportunities as a result. Thus, it is not interest groups per se that
merit substantive intervention, but only interest groups suffering from
systemic discrimination. By limiting the scope of the principle in this
matter to concern for only deep seated problems of systemic
discrimination, we avoid the danger of admitting a principle that will
include so many special cases as to undermine the original principle
of non-intervention.
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The profound implications of systemic discrimination also mitigate
against simple procedural attempts to achieve better treatment of
women in the workplace. It has been suggested that changing the
bargaining units might help. 9 Separate unions for women and other
minority groups would solve the immediate problem of being outvoted
by the majority, but it would only push the problem one step back.
The employer would then be negotiating with two unions, one composed of men and one of women who were too few or too weak to
win their interests within a single bargaining unit. It is hard to
imagine that this outcome would not just dilute the strength of both
units and crystallize the conflict between them, presumably to the
employer's advantage. The union for the minority group would likely
be even more vulnerable when isolated than its members were when
they were included in the larger union with at least some shared
interests. Certainly, historical attempts by women at forming separate
unions do not provide much ground for optimism in this approach as
a viable solution. 2 There does not seem to be any way available for
reducing the problems of systemic discrimination occurring within the
union as well as outside it without legislative direction such as affirmative action plans. It is because these plans promote justice, and
because no other approach seems to achieve the same results, that
we are justified in modifying the principle against substantative labour
law under these circumstances.
It is important to note that women do not always fare badly
in unions. Mafly unions have been quite conscientious in trying to

eliminate the effects of systemic discrimination and have actively pursued questions of justice associated with gender. Many men within
unions do not vote merely in accordance with their own self-interest
but are sensitive to the demands of justice and altruism. Therefore,
in some unions, despite a male majority in the membership, women's
issues are given high priority. In other unions, women have in recent
years assumed positions of responsibility and power and use their
leadership roles to help shape policy. Thus, it should not be concluded
that unions never voluntarily pursue affirmative action, but only that
they do it rarely, and often without much enthusiasm and usually
against determined employer resistance. Given the importance of the
19. Adina Schwartz and David Beatty made this suggestion in discussions
at the Westminister Institute, November 1982. Separate unions have been of some
help in the face of racial discrimination. Their record on gender discrimination is more

questionable.
20. This was tried by the Toronto Bell Telephone Operators in 1907, where
the independent women's union lost an important strike. See P. PHILLIPS & E. PHILLIPS,
supra note 7, at 138-41.
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issue, and the generally poor history of the voluntary approach, it
seems to be time for a more reliable solution.
There is one other type of consideration that is popularly believed
to justify legislative interference in the substance of collective bargaining and hence should be reviewed. That is the question of the public
interest. Legislation is thought to be justifiable if it is in the public
interest; in fact, many people define the legislature's responsibility
as that of drafting legislation to further the public interest.
Collective bargaining frequently affects the interests of people
who are not party to the process. Collective bargaining occurs between
the two principal parties, but they are not the only ones with interests
at stake; frequently, others are seriously affected. The costs of
implementing contract provisions are passed on to consumers or taxpayers. The terms agreed to as working conditions affect the level
and quality of service available to consumers. Also, when negotiations
break down and a strike or lock-out occurs, consumers may be very
seriously affected by the loss of goods or services available; they
sometimes suffer more from work stoppages than either party to the
bargaining agreement.
There is a common sentiment in North America that collective
bargaining often affects the public interest negatively. In general, this
sentiment is not well founded, but there are undoubtedly cases when
it is true. When the public interest is seriously threatened, here as
elsewhere, it is the government's responsibility to intervene. It is for
such reasons that strikes and lock-outs are commonly prohibited or
tolerated for only limited periods in "essential services," even though
it is an extremely difficult exercise in value judgments and politics
to determine what can properly be deemed an essential service. This
sort of procedural response seems to be consistent with the general
principles underlying labour law.
The question at issue here, though, is whether the government
can actually dictate some of the terms for collective agreements when
the public interest is thought to be at stake. To answer that question
we must first define "the public interest." If one defines it simply
as some overall positive utility we again encounter the problem of
justice for minorities whose interests are outweighed by competing
majoritarian concerns. Also, a principle justifying legislative intervention whenever it serves the public interest defined in this sense would
be far too broad. Such a principle would essentially suffocate the
important principle we began with, that of respecting the bargaining
process and the will of the parties in an employment relationship.
If that integrity of bargaining principle could be overcome whenever
good consequences might arise, it would not retain much force. In
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fact, the whole process of collective bargaining would probably be
undermined because either party could then refuse to make concessions, relying on government intervention to impose a settlement
whenever a lack of agreement may threaten public interests. Each
party might hope to do better by government direction than by
negotiation; hence, it might purposely hold out. The government would
become a third party to negotiation with a special, decisive power.
The entire character of collective bargaining would be transformed.
Intervention when the parties disagree is quite a different matter from intervention when the parties agree to ignore a matter of
justice. In the former case the government cannot help but favour
the interests of one side over the other, a~d no impartial solutions
are available. The result would be bitterness and a sense of injury
by the least favoured party. In the latter case neither side is victorious, and the government maintains a neutral posture vis a vis
employer and union. More importantly, the grounds of intervention
are properly within its authority, namely reducing injustice; they do
not amount to manipulation of labour market forces, as substantive
intervention in the event of dispute would.
It is not appropriate for the government to seek to play judicial
referee between two well-defined sets of interests in conflict either.
In the case of labour relations, where the parties share certain interests in common in addition to competing over others, the historically
evolved method of autonomous collective bargaining remains the most
effective means of proceeding despite its well-known flaws. However,
the government does have an obligation to intervene on behalf of
disadvantaged members in matters of serious social justice when those
members have no other process to appeal to. When neither party
sincerely assumes responsibility for matters of justice within their
power, it is appropriate to require them to take account of such
matters.
The most problematic issues of intervention on public interest
grounds arise when we consider the question of bargaining in the
public sector. In this case the government wears two hats and the
complexity of its dual roles and responsibilities makes the qualifications against acting in the public interest far more severe. When the
public interest appears to coincide with the employer's interest the
government is in a most awkward position. It is difficult for anyone,
including its own members, to be certain whether concern for selfinterest or the public interest takes priority. For example, one can
presume that the legislated wage controls for public workers which
most Canadian legislatures introduced in the fall of 1982 and the spring
of 1983 made good politics. Nevertheless, the various governments
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/5
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involved had such a vested interest in these policies that it is difficult to evaluate their motives as purely those of addressing the public
good.
The government, as an employer, has an enormous degree of
power in comparison with private employers. Whatever it cannot win
as a concession in bargaining it can proceed to legislate. In fact,
governments can and do write special legislation to limit their own
employees' options under collective bargaining. They sometimes even
change the terms and conditions of employment for their workers
unilaterally in the midst of a collective agreement.81 Such excessive
power undermines the whole collective bargaining structure since one
party always has it in its power to force compliance when it fails to
win concessions.
The fact of collective bargaining in the public sector places the
government in a unique situation. Its obligations as guardian of the
public interest may conflict with its obligation to play by the accepted
rules of labour relations. Nonetheless, I am less willing than others
to conclude that collective bargaining is inappropriate in the public
service. Employees in the public sector are in need of the same sort
of collective bargaining power as are employees in the private sector. Confronted with the frequently unrealistic promises which politicians often make in their campaigns, the case can be made that public
service workers need even greater job protection than private sector
workers, since political forces may be even more erratic and inconsistent than those of the marketplace; it is unfair to demand that workers
have to bear the burden of rash political slogans without having access
to collective bargaining.
Nonetheless, the government is in a particularly difficult position as an employer. In most cases it must continue to provide the
service in question. Businesses faced with intractable unions usually
maintain as a final option the choice to close down completely. Governments do not have this choice. In most cases of public sector bargaining there is no alternative service available and governments maintain a responsibility to provide citizens with the service in question,
whether it is education, hospital care, mail service, fire fighting, police
protection, air traffic control, or delivery of social services. They must
reach agreement with their unions eventually. This gives public service unions a powerful sense of confidence.
21. The Quebec government in January 1983 and the British Columbia government in July 1983 each took such action against public service workers for two recent
striking examples.
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However, that confidence is balanced in turn by the union's
recognition of the fact that governments have far greater power than
does any other employer. At least at the federal and provincial level,
governments can ultimately insist on whatever they want; they can
"win" if their motivation is strong enough. Governments that control
labour legislation have resources available to them that are difficult
to resist. Yet it is improper for them to abuse this power for political
gain. The government's interest is not identical with the public interest
and one should be most careful to avoid blurring the distinction. Given
the difficulty of drawing that distinction, we must be most wary of
governments that invoke public interest arguments to take action that
coincides with their political interest.
This complexity in the situation of dealing with public service
unions persuades many analysts that public service unions are an
anomaly that can best be addressed by eliminating them. I am not
convinced that the difficulties merit such drastic action, and in fact
fear that eliminating public service unions would serve to exacerbate
the dilemma, since the government's power as employer would become
even stronger. In any event, unions in the public sector are a fact
of contemporary life, and so long as they do exist we need normative
principles to guide the action of governments who deal with them.
The legislative approach to follow with public service unions is
to be particularly loyal to the traditional approach and concentrate
on procedural issues. Governments must anticipate the problem of
delivering services to their citizens when labour disputes arise and
develop procedures to provide for public needs. They must ensure
that there are fair mechanisms available for resolving conflicts
whenever they are likely to occur. They must not, however, rely on
their legislative power to favour their own interests in contractual
matters. Here, as elsewhere, it is improper for legislation to be used
to settle disputes in the interest of one of the parties. The effectiveness of collective bargaining as a process demands that the parties resolve conflicts of interest by negotiation and not preferential
legislation. Therefore, we cannot conclude that questions of public interest are always adequate grounds for substantive legislation.
It is only if we restrict the term "the public interest" to the
very limited aspect of social justice that we find clear ground for
substantative labour law. A "hands off' legislative approach to collective bargaining is most compatible overall with the broadly defined
public interest. The only justification for legislative intervention is
to deal with the special case of social justice, a particular aspect of
the public interest that sometimes requires legislative intervention
to bring it about.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The emphasis on procedural legislation governing collective
bargaining is deliberate and proper. Collective bargaining is a
legitimate approach to setting the terms and conditions of employment for a group of workers, and it is fostered when regulated by
procedural rules and minimal substantive direction. It is far from
perfect as a mechanism. One of the most serious objections to collective bargaining as a process for setting the terms and conditions of
employment is that it is an option available only to the strongest
workers. Those workers in greatest need of the benefits of collective
bargaining are generally unable to unionize. Nonetheless, it seems that
collective bargaining should be protected and not weakened. Since,
in most circumstances, any attempt to prescribe certain terms and
conditions of employment is likely to make the process of collective
bargaining over remaining matters even more difficult and to foster
a sense of injustice in the party which is least favoured by the legislation, substantative legislation is usually a mistake.
Thus, a government should strive to maintain a neutral and
impartial position with respect to the interest subject to negotiations.
It should not allow itself to be used by either party to evade the
need for bargaining. This is especially important when it is itself a
participant in bargaining, as it is with respect to public service unions.
Legislation cannot be used as an alternative to negotiation without
undermining the entire collective bargaining system. The government
should be especially circumspect in light of the temptation to view
its own interest as equivalent to the public interest and conclude that
employees' interests are so relatively minor as to be safely
disregarded.
Legislation governing the terms of a contract is justified only
if it is introduced to govern all employment relationships and sets
minimal standards below which no one should be expected to work,
such as that which occurs in the labour standards codes. Such broad
legislation is consistent with legitimate governmental concern in questions of social welfare so fundamental as to constitute matters of
justice.
Beyond these sorts of questions regarding basic labour standards,
there seems to be only one justifiable ground for substantive
legislative intervention in the details of a contract, which is the case
of addressing the employment interests of minority groups subject
to the serious inequalities of systemic discrimination. Sometimes, considerations of justice require that special provisions be made for certain groups, such as affirmative action plans for women. Yet when
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the arrangements are not in the specific interest of either party to
collective bargaining, government ought to assume the responsibility
of ensuring that appropriate measures are taken. Under these limited
conditions, substantive legislation addresses a neglected matter of
justice but it does not favour either party; hence, it does not threaten
the general bargaining process. In any circumstance where the public
good in question involves a question of justice, substantive legislation is appropriate, and it should not be dismissed because of concern
for the principle urging autonomy of the parties when collective
bargaining operates. Social justice takes priority even over the valued
principles of effective collective bargaining.
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